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Newsgroups: alt.folklore.urban,alt.folklore.military
From: hsm@unislc.slc.unisys.com (Helge Moulding)
Subject: Stumbling over the Maginot Line
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 1995 13:10:20 GMT

The matter of the Maginot Line came up on AFU a short while ago, when someone (Ray?) told the story of the lost guns of Alsace Lorraine. (French, looking to fortify their borders against any future aggressions from "les Boche," were looking for likely sites to run a rail line. When they found some rusty tracks they followed them to a locked shed, containing a well oiled German rail gun, complete with an old man who had been maintaining the thing since WWI.)

I suggested that the fact that Germany attacked France through Belgium both in WWI and WWII had proved that such a line of defense was useless, and didn't think the French would try it again.

But.

First, Schlieffen and Moltke. Schlieffen had come up with the idea of attacking France through Belgium. Moltke was being blamed for the plan's failure, for using too few troops. It turns out that Schlieffen had recognized that Germany didn't have the troops to pull off his plan, and modified his plans accordingly. Moltke used these modifications. It wasn't like he somehow spoiled a master plan.

The Maginot line was where I thought it was. Built after WWI, it covered the French-German border from Luxembourg to Switzerland. Not at all useful against an attack from Belgium. Why the French built it, isn't clear to me, except that they might have decided to keep the Germans honest. As it was, they *were* expecting an attack through Belgium, again. And the French expected it, with more guns and tanks than the Germans had. Except then a German plane crashed in Belgium, and the German plans ended up in enemy hands. So Hitler changed tack. Just a little. He still came through Belgium, but used the hilly terrain of the Ardennes.

The French didn't feel much like fighting, so the Battle of France was over in a few months.

The myths I had bought, from teachers in school, no less, included

1. Moltke spoiled a master plan.
2. Hitler attacked in WWII as the Kaiser did in WWI.
3. The French were unprepared for the German blitz.

Doing research on these items, I discovered that my Encyclopedia Brittanica has the story straight. But it also has the myth in it: the section on Schlieffen mentions Moltke spoiling the plan. The section on Maginot mentions the WWII repeat of the Schlieffen plan. Only the very long section on the "World Wars" has these stories straight. It was Shenkman's book _Legends, Lies, & Cherished Myths of World History_ put me on track to find the discrepancies, and which one might be correct.

Incidentally, Shenkman warns that the book contains *his* version of the truth.

As an aside, the French counter to the Schlieffen plan was known as "Plan XVII." As a kid, there was always this "Trick Siebzehn" which helped things to come out right. Suppose there was a project, which had a fussy part to it. Well, the fellow showing how it was done would give you his "Trick Siebzehn," and everything looked easy.

Ironically, the French "Plan XVII" didn't go off well at all. I wonder if the German use of the term was originally meant in a sarcastic fashion? Or maybe the two terms have nothing to do with each other. I guess I'll never know. --

        Helge "Encylcopedia" Moulding
        (Just another guy with a weird name)

From: warinner@flood.xnet.com (Robert Warinner)
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.urban,alt.folklore.military
Subject: Re: Stumbling over the Maginot Line
Date: 11 Sep 1995 22:12:39 GMT

Though I have not read the book you cite, I think it glosses over the details of what happened in its urge to debunk.

Helge Moulding (hsm@unislc.slc.unisys.com) wrote: > First, Schlieffen and Moltke. Schlieffen had come up with
> the idea of attacking France through Belgium. Moltke was
> being blamed for the plan's failure, for using too few
> troops. It turns out that Schlieffen had recognized that
> Germany didn't have the troops to pull off his plan, and
> modified his plans accordingly. Moltke used these
> modifications. It wasn't like he somehow spoiled a master
> plan.

I think a couple of clarifications are in order:

• Shlieffen did not believe that Germany had enough troops to fight Russia and France simultaneously. I believe he favored knocking out Russia first. There are good discussions of this in Alistair Horne's "The Price of Glory" and John Keegan's "History of Warfare".
• I think the weight of historical opinion does fault Moltke for changing Schlieffen's plan, though not through weakening the right wing (the one that went through Belgium). Schlieffen devised the plan based on certain assumptions on German mobilization abilities. Moltke changed the mobilization system and used reservist divisions as front-line combat troops. Thus Moltke had sufficient troops for the Schlieffen plan with enough to attack with the left wing in central France. This was a violation of Schlieffen's plan which did envision a French attack in central France (in order to recover Alsace-Lorraine) but planned to give ground before it thus drawing French forces away from Paris and the right wing. The analogy that was used to describe it was a revolving door, the harder the French pushed in Alsace-Lorraine, the quicker the right wing would swing around and strike them in the back.

> The Maginot line was where I thought it was. Built after
> WWI, it covered the French-German border from Luxembourg to
> Switzerland. Not at all useful against an attack from
> Belgium. Why the French built it, isn't clear to me, except
> that they might have decided to keep the Germans honest. As
> it was, they *were* expecting an attack through Belgium,
> again. And the French expected it, with more guns and tanks
> than the Germans had. Except then a German plane crashed in
> Belgium, and the German plans ended up in enemy hands. So
> Hitler changed tack. Just a little. He still came through
> Belgium, but used the hilly terrain of the Ardennes.

For a debunking of history, this needs debunking. First, the evolution of the German plan of attack is considerably more complicated. At first, the Germans did plan a replay of the Schlieffen plan. However, von Manstein drew up an alternate plan, codenamed "Gelbe". Hitler was unhappy with the original plan, feeling it was unimaginative and bound to fail. von Manstein managed to get his plan presented to Hitler with some adroit lobbying who seized on it and forced its acceptance.

On the other side, the British and French fully anticipated a German attack through Belgium and planned to meet it by advancing as far as possible into Belgium. Unfortunately, this made the German attack all the more effective as the French and British mobile armies were trapped leaving only second class troops manning the Maginot fortifications.

My memory is a little hazy on the capture of the German plans. I do remember that it was shortly before the German attack and the result of a plane crash on Belgian territory. At the time, Belgium was trying to maintain a precarious neutrality and did not pass the plan on to the British or French for fear it would compromise their neutrality. Since the Germans could not have switched the focus of their attack from Belgium to the Ardennes, I assume that the plans captured were those of the Ardennes attack, not the WWII version of the Schleiffen plan first conceived. The Belgians did turn over the captured German plans but the attack was too rapid and the French and British were overwhelmed anyway. I will do some hunting around tonight and post the results instead of relying on my possible faulty memory.

All this is well covered in numerous books (my personal favorite is Horne's "To Lose a Battle") and was recently discussed in soc.history.war.world-war-ii.

> The myths I had bought, from teachers in school, no less,
> included
>
> 1) Moltke spoiled a master plan.
> 2) Hitler attacked in WWII as the Kaiser did in WWI.
> 3) The French were unprepared for the German blitz.

I would say 1 and 3 are historically true while 2 is not. The French were unprepared for the German blitzkrieg, though more on a doctrine and orgizational level. Some "myths" of history are true, just like some urban legends are true.

Andrew Warinner
"Semper ubi sub ubi"
warinner@xnet.com
warinner@ttd.teradyne.com

From: warinner@xnet.com (Andrew Warinner)
Subject: Re: Stumbling over the Maginot Line
Date: 12 Sep 1995 03:52:48 GMT

First, I owe Helge Moulding an apology. I was too quick on the draw and made several errors which at the end leave Mr. Moulding closer to the truth than I was.

First, the original German plans for the attack on France did not aim at a replay of the Schleiffen plan but were much more limited in scope (more on this below).

Second, Manstein's reworked plan was codenamed "Sichelschnitt" ("Sickle Stroke"), not "Gelbe". The code name for the original attack plan was "Fall Gelb" ("Case Yellow").

In an attempt to appease the wrath of the gods of AFU, I offer research. The following chronology is drawn from Alistair Horne's "To Lose a Battle" and John Keegans "The Second World War".

9/27/39 Poland surrenders.

9/27/39 Hitler notifies OKH to begin planning an attack on France to take place as soon as possible. The plan is codenamed "Fall Gelb" (Case Yellow).

10/19/39 Case Yellow is limited in scope to taking ground in Belgium for air bases and ports on the North Sea.

10/25/39 Hitler proposes an attack directly into France avoiding Belgium.

10/30/39 Hitler proposes an attack into France from the Ardennes.

10/31/39 The first of six Manstein proposals arrives at OKH for an attack from the Ardennes.

11/23/39 Hitler addresses conference of 180 top German commanders in an attempt to get the planning of Case Yellow moving.

December - January 39 Case Yellow scheduled and cancelled four times. The attack is finally scheduled for 1/17/95. Halder attempts to get rid of Manstein by promoting him to a corps command in East Prussia out of his chief of staff position in Runstedt's HQ of Army Group A. Corps commanders traditionally have an interview with the head of state upon assuming command.

1/10/40 Plane crash in Belgium allows capture of portions of Case Yellow. German military attache in Holland learns of its capture and notifies Berlin. Belgium and Holland mobilize.

1/16/40 Hitler cancels Case Yellow permanently and orders OKH to devise a new plan.

2/17/40 Schmundt learns of Mansteins plan and arranges for Manstein to spend an entire day with Hitler presenting his plan. Hitler accepts his plan and thereafter overrides any objections coming from high German commanders.

2/24/40 A draft plan is produced codenamed "Sichelschnitt" (Sickle Stroke).

5/10/40 Sichelschnitt begins.

5/11/40 French and British move to their planned positions in Belgium along the River Dyle.

5/13/40 German forces cross the River Meuse.

5/20/40 German forces reach Abbeville, cutting off the BEF and mobile French armies.

5/27/40 Belgium surrenders.

5/27/40 - 6/4/40 BEF and some French troops evacuated from Dunkirk.

6/22/40 France surrenders.

To sum up, Case Yellow, Hitler's various ideas and Manstein's plans did not attempt to repeat the Schleiffen plan as there was no strategic reason to do so. The French did not need to retrieve Alsace-Lorraine and the Maginot line prevented any attack along its length so the Schleiffen plan was inoperative.

However, the history of Sichelschnitt is one of coincidences but the plane crash that delivered the Case Yellow plans into Belgian hands is one of some importance. Hitler was never fully reconciled to Case Yellow and its cancellation should be seen in the context of the struggle by Hitler to impose his will on the top German command. The plane crash gave Hitler a well-timed excuse for cancelling Case Yellow. The credit for the plan probably should be divided between Hitler and Manstein whose thoughts ran on amazingly parallel lines.

Andrew Warinner
"Semper ubi sub ubi"
warinner@xnet.com
warinner@ttd.teradyne.com