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Legal Beagles
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One Hit Too Many - Commit A Crime!
There simply is no magical number for use of any drug that will make you "legally insane." Aside from the common tendency to confuse "legal insanity," "incompetence for purposes of civil commitment," and "competency to stand trial," there is no law (in the U.S. or any other jurisdiction, as far as research will reveal) that will pronounce you "legally insane" simply because you have used a drug a certain number of times. The traditional rule, which may have been modified in any given jurisdiction, is that use of an intoxicant -- even heavy use -- is not sufficient to establish an insanity defense. On the other hand, voluntary consumption resulting in intoxication may be used to negate an element of the crime -- namely, a requirement of specific intent, or premeditation: If you're drunk enough, you might not be able to form the required specific intent. The 1984 amendments to the federal insanity defense statutes (guess what event prompted this legislation) narrowed the common law definition of legal insanity, but retained the restrictions on the use of "intoxication" as the basis for an insanity defense. For instance, in _United States v. Knott,_ 894 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that under 18 U.S.C. sec. 17, voluntary intoxication together with schizophrenia was not enough to prove an insanity defense. Under the federal statute, and under traditional principles of common law, a mental disease or defect must be beyond the control of the defendant, and insanity that is in any part due to a defendant's voluntary intoxication is not beyond his control. However, under the federal statute, proof of intoxication may be relevant to negating specific intent. _See, e.g.,_ _United States v. Frisbee,_ 623 F.Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985). To recap, voluntary use of an intoxicant -- even LSD -- doesn't mean that a criminal defendant qualifies for an insanity defense. Depending upon the charged offense, however, the intoxication might be sufficient to negate proof of specific intent. For additional information, see: Jay M. Zitter, "Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C. sec. 17, Providing for Insanity Defense in Federal Criminal Prosecutions," 118 A.L.R.Fed. 265 (1994 and supplements) Vitauts M. Gulbis, "Admissibility of Expert Testimony As to Whether Accused Had Specific Intent Necessary for Conviction," 16 A.L.R.4th 666 (1981 and supplements) Eunice A. Eichelberger, "Automatism or Unconsciousness as Defense to Criminal Charge," 27 A.L.R.4th 1067 (1981 and supplements) Michelle Migdal Gee, "Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility -- State Cases," 9 A.L.R.4th 526 (1981 and supplements) Phillip E. Hassman, "Drug Addicition or Related Mental State as Defense to Criminal Charge," 73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1977 and supplements) All of the cited annotations are available, for a fee, from WestDoc. |
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References: Version 0.3, last updated: Wed Aug 30 9:26:51 US/Central 2000 |
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